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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court 
of appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2A-3(2)(e). Cerroni 
also appeals as a matter of right under Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err when it denied Cerroni's Motion to 
Suppress and erroneously found the search legal and consented to 
by Cerroni? When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion to suppress, this court will uphold the trial 
court's underlying findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous. State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1976); State v. 
Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n Amendment IV 8 
Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n Ar t . 1 §14 8 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) ( I ) 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
Appellant (hereinafter "Cerroni") entered a plea of guilty to 
possession of a controlled substance on January 21, 1998, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Cerroni entered 
this plea after an Order denying Cerroni's Motion to Suppress was 
entered in the trial court on April 13, 1998, and signed Nunc Pro 
Tunc to August 25, 1997. The plea was conditioned upon an appeal 
being filed on the Order of the Court denying the Cerroni's Motion 
to Suppress. In the event that Cerroni's appeal is successful his 
plea will be set aside. Cerroni was sentenced on March 9, 1998. 
Cerroni is now appealing that Order because of the arguments 
contained herein. 
B. COURSE OP PROCEEDINGS: 
Appellant filed and argued a Motion to Suppress. An Order 
denying the Motion was entered in the trial court. Appellant then 
entered a plea of guilty conditioned upon appealing the Order. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT: 
The trial court heard argument on the Motion to Suppress and 
entered an Order denying Defendant's Motion. The trial court 
accepted a plea of guilty and sentenced Defendant. Defendant is 
not incarcerated at this time. 
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D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: 
On or about September 21, 1996, Appellant (hereinafter 
"Cerroni") was stopped by Utah Highway Patrol Officer Bruce Graham 
(hereinafter "Graham") for an alleged equipment violation. Graham 
alleged that he stopped Cerroni because the rear license plate on 
Cerroni's vehicle was not illuminated, the right tail light was 
inoperable, and the reverse lights in the rear of the vehicle were 
broken off and there were no light bulbs in them. (Transcript of 
Motion to Suppress at 6; hereinafter "Motion to Suppress"). 
Graham's patrol vehicle was parked perpendicular to Cerroni's path 
of travel. (Motion to Suppress at 6). In other words, Graham was 
able to see intricate details on the rear of Cerroni's vehicle, 
such as a cracked tail light cover and missing reverse light 
bulbs, when it was traveling by his parked vehicle late at night. 
It is interesting that Graham testified that he could see that the 
reverse lights' bulbs were missing even though Cerroni was not 
driving in reverse. 
Graham then pulled his vehicle behind and followed Cerroni 
for a distance of two to four blocks and effectuated a stop of 
Cerroni's vehicle. (Motion to Suppress at 7:46). Following the 
stop, Graham approached the driver's side of Cerroni's vehicle and 
testified that he saw a number of open containers of alcohol 
inside the vehicle. (Motion to Suppress at 7:8) 
Graham testified that he asked Cerroni to exit and walk to 
the rear of his vehicle for "two reasons: One to check for Driving 
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Under the Influence of alcohol or drugs, and number two, to search 
for and retrieve the open containers." (Motion to Suppress at 8). 
Graham never investigated the open containers in the back of 
Cerroni's vehicle. Graham testified that the reason he told 
Cerroni to step from his vehicle was to "check [Cerroni] for 
Driving Under the Influence and to search for and retrieve the 
open containers"; Graham never investigated either of these 
allegations. Once Graham learned that Cerroni was not driving 
under the influence or decided not to further investigate driving 
under the influence, Cerroni should have been free to leave. 
Graham testified that as Cerroni was walking to the rear of 
the vehicle, he informed Cerroni that he was going to pat him down 
to make sure that he had no weapons. (Motion to Suppress at 8). 
Graham did this without any belief that Cerroni was armed and 
presently dangerous. Graham's own testimony confirms this when he 
stated that he knew that it was a watch in Cerroni's front pocket. 
(Motion to Suppress at 10). At the Suppression Hearing, Graham 
denied that he performed a Terry frisk on Cerroni. (Motion to 
Suppress at 17). He testified that Cerroni just voluntarily 
pulled the watch from his pocket when Graham asked him what it 
was. (Motion to Suppress at 17). This testimony, however, was 
directly contradicted by another officer that arrived to back-up 
Graham. 
Officer John Michael McMahon (hereinafter "McMahon") 
testified that when he arrived on the scene, Graham was standing 
near the driver's side window of Cerroni's vehicle. (Motion to 
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Suppress at 24). Shortly after McMahon's arrival, Cerroni was 
asked to exit the vehicle. (Motion to Suppress at 24). McMahon 
testified that as Cerroni was walking to the rear of the vehicle, 
Graham began to pat him down. (Motion to Suppress at 25:33). 
According to McMahon's testimony, just prior to the time 
Graham began patting-down Cerroni, Graham asked Cerroni if he had 
arrested him before for marijuana. (Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript at 7). Cerroni responded that he had not been arrested 
by Graham for marijuana in the past. Id. Graham then looked at 
McMahon and stated, "I believe we have arrested him before." 
(Motion to Suppress at 32). Graham also testified that he 
continously asked Cerroni if he had arrested him before. (Motion 
to Suppress at 17, 18). 
McMahon also testified that he knew the item in Cerroni's 
pocket was not a weapon. (Motion to Suppress at 33:34) He could 
clearly see that it was round and sticking out of the pocket 
roughly an inch—nothing that could have been a weapon. Moreover, 
McMahon never felt threatened or in danger during the stop of 
Cerroni. (Motion to Suppress at 33). This clearly demonstrates 
that neither officer felt that Cerroni posed any threat to either 
of them. 
McMahon testified that Graham had informed him that he had 
video taped the incident with his dash mounted video camera and 
had reviewed the video in preparation for the Preliminary Hearing. 
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 13;Motion to Suppress at 36-
38). This video would have shown the condition of Cerroni's 
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vehicle at the time of the stop, as well as the pat-down search 
performed by Graham. This video was never produced by the State 
during Discovery. Graham later testified that he did not believe 
that he recorded the incident. (Motion to Suppress at 20). He 
later admitted, however, that he may have given the tape to the 
UHP secretary and did not know why it was not available. (Motion 
to Suppress at 21). The only tape made available to Cerroni was 
the tape made by McMahon after Cerroni had been arrested and 
placed in the back of McMahon's vehicle. This tape did show the 
back of Cerroni's vehicle, but the license plate is not visible 
because of an intercoding device. (Motion to Suppress at 42, 43). 
This blurred section of the video screen is positioned exactly on 
top of the license plate and tail lights. (Motion to Suppress at 
42, 43). 
Graham testified that as Cerroni pulled the watch from his 
pocket, a baggy of what was later determined to be 
methamphetamine, was pulled out at the same time. (Motion to 
Suppress at 10). Graham reached for the baggy and pulled it out 
of Cerroni's pocket. (Motion to Suppress at 10). At that point 
Graham turned the investigation over to McMahon, and a short time 
after that Cerroni was arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is clear from the Record that Utah Highway Patrol Officer 
Bruce Graham stopped Appellant for an alleged equipment violation 
with no probable cause or a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
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Appellant was violating any laws. There was evidence presented 
that the officer had made a video recording of the stop and that 
the State failed to produce the video during Discovery. Had the 
State produced the video tape of the stop, Appellant's assertion 
that the stop was not valid would have been clear at the 
Suppression Hearing. It is clear that the officer had an ulterior 
motive for the stop when he continuously asked Appellant if he had 
arrested him before for possession of marijuana. Because the stop 
was not justified at its inception, any evidence derived from the 
stop should have been suppressed by the trial court. 
Graham did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
Appellant was armed and presently dangerous. Graham's own 
testimony indicates that he did not suspect that Appellant had 
anything more than a watch in his pocket. Without such a 
suspicion, Graham had no right to perform a Terry frisk—in fact, 
no right to have even touched Appellant. Furthermore, even if a 
proper and legal Terry frisk had been performed, once the officer 
was assured there was no safety threat he could not inquire any 
further into the pocket watch. Therefore, Appellant argues that 
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated and that the evidence 
found during the illegal search should have been suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL OFFICER BRUCE GRAHAM DID NOT HAVE 
PROBABLE CAUSE OR A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO 
STOP APPELLANT'S VEHICLE 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
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guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures..." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The United States Supreme 
Court has held that "stopping an automobile and detaining its 
occupants constitutefs] a seizure within the meaning of [the 
Fourth Amendment], even though the purpose of the stop is limited 
and the resulting detention is quite brief." Accord State v. 
Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990)(Fourth Amendment rights 
apply to traffic stops "regardless of the reason for the stop or 
the brevity of the detention"). 
In order to determine whether an officer complied with the 
Fourth Amendment, this Court will make a dual inquiry: (1) Was the 
police officer's action 'justified at its inception'? And (2) Was 
the resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place'?" State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 
1994)(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
1879 (1968)). 
In State v. Matison, 875 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1994), the 
court held that the stop of the defendant's vehicle was not 
'justified at its inception,' and was therefore in violation of 
the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 
The defendant in Matison was stopped after a deputy sheriff 
witnessed his vehicle "fishtail" while exiting an interstate road. 
The officer testified that he did not stop the defendant 
initially, but rather waited some time and then stopped the 
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vehicle to investigate why he had fishtailed. The Court held that 
the officer's actions were not justified at the inception of the 
stop, and thus the first prong was not satisfied, and therefore 
the stop was illegal. 
The second question under the dual inquiry asks whether the 
resulting detention was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. 
In Matison, the Court held that "[0]nce a traffic stop is made, 
the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" Id. (Quoting 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983)). 
The Court continued by quoting its previous decision in State v. 
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990)(Discussing the permissible 
length and scope of a traffic stop): 
An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a 
driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer 
check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has 
produced a driver's license and evidence of entitlement to 
use the vehicle, 'he must be allowed to proceed on his way, 
without being subjected to further delay by police for 
additional questioning.' 
(quoting United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 
1988)) 
The Court continued by restating the principle found in Lopez, 
supra, 
regarding further detention by the police: 
'Investigative questioning that further detains the driver 
must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion 
based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality 
of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the 
stop.' 
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(accord State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181f 183 (Utah 1987)). 
The case at bar presents this Court with a similar situation 
it faced in Matison, supra. Cerroni was not stopped based on 
probable cause or a reasoncible, articulable suspicion that he had 
committed any criminal or traffic violations. 
Cerroni testified that he drove by Graham, late at night, 
while his vehicle was parked perpendicular to his path of travel. 
(Motion to Suppress at 6). In spite of the darkness and the 
direction he was facing, Graham testified that he could see that 
the reverse light covers at the rear of the vehicle were broken 
off and that there were no light bulbs in them, that the right 
tail light was inoperable, and the rear license plate was not 
illuminated. Id. Graham then pulled his vehicle behind and 
followed Cerroni for approximately four blocks and effectuated a 
stop of Cerroni's vehicle. Id. Cerroni asks this simple question 
to the Court: assuming arguendo, that the reverse-lights' bulbs 
were missing, how could Graham have seen this at night if Cerroni 
was not driving in reverse? Cerroni also argues that his rear 
license plate was illuminated. 
As further evidence that Graham stopped Cerroni for reasons 
other than traffic violations, Cerroni testified that immediately 
after he rolled down his window Graham informed him that he knew 
him. (Motion to Suppress at 47). Both McMahon and Graham admitted 
Graham recognized Cerroni from a prior marijauna arrest. 
One of the officers that was present during the traffic stop 
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(McMahon) testified that Graham informed him that he had reviewed 
the video of the Cerroni stop that he had made with his dash-
mounted video camera. (Preliminary Hearing at 13). In fact, 
McMahon testified that Graham had informed him that he had 
reviewed the tape to figure out when he had asked Cerroni if he 
had arrested him before. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 17). 
During cross-examination, Graham was very evasive about the video 
tape. He testified that he is not certain if one was made or if 
one was what ever became of it. Again, McMahon clearly recalled 
that Graham had informed him that he had reviewed the tape. 
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 13, 17: Motion to Suppress at 
36-38). 
The State, however, failed to furnish Cerroni with this video 
during Discovery, claiming that Graham never made a video of the 
stop. Had Cerroni been furnished with the video during Discovery, 
it would clearly show that his rear license plate was illuminated, 
and that the crack in the tail light did not show any white light. 
It is interesting to note that Graham never investigated the 
reason he told Cerroni to exit the vehicle in the first place— 
namely suspected Driving Under the Influence. Cerroni does not 
argue that Graham had the right to investigate the alleged open 
container of alcohol in the vehicle. Cerroni does argue, however, 
that Graham never did investigate. Graham simply commanded 
Cerroni to exit the vehicle and began patting-down his clothing. 
Graham's stop of Cerroni's vehicle was not justified at its 
inception. It is clear from Graham's testimony that he did not 
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have probable cause or a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
Cerroni was committing or had committed any criminal or traffic 
violations. Production of the video during discovery by the State 
would have shown that the stop was not justified. Because the 
stop was tainted from the inception, the evidence derived in 
violation of Cerroni's Fourth Amendment rights should have been 
suppressed by the trial court. 
POINT II 
OFFICER GRAHAM HAD NO RIGHT TO CONDUCT A PAT-DOWN SEARCH 
OF CERRONI 
The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
27 (1968), refused to sanction any intrusion based on nothing more 
substantial than "inarticulate hunches." Rather, a police officer 
must, prior to instituting a frisk, reasonably conclude in light 
of his experience that the unusual conduct he observes might 
suggest danger. Id. At 30. 
The Terry Court held that a frisk was reasonable under 
certain circumstances. Those circumstances include: (1) "where a 
police officer observes unusual conduct" which he interprets "in 
light of his experience" as indicating possible criminal activity 
and present danger, (2) "where in the course of investigating this 
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable 
inquiries, and (3) where nothing in the initial stages of the 
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or 
other's safety." (FN5) Id. At 30, 88 S.Ct. At 1884. The Court 
stated that while different circumstances may require modification 
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of the Terry components, the lawfulness of every frisk remains 
subject to the "central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment—the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." 
ISL At 19, S.Ct. At 1878-79 (emphasis added). 
Prior to instituting a frisk, a police officer must conclude 
in light of his experience that the unusual conduct he observes 
might suggest criminal activity and danger. Id. At 30, S.Ct. At 
1884. The officer does not need to base his conclusion that a 
suspect is armed on absolute certainty, id. At 27, 88 S.Ct. At 
1883, but rather depends on "whether a reasonably prudent man in 
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety 
or that of others was in danger." (FN6) Id. An officer must be 
able to point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion." Id. At 21, 88 S.Ct. At 1880. 
In State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah App. 1987), the 
court found the search performed by a police officer to be 
unconstitutional. In that case, the officer had seen the 
defendant and two companions walking down the street. The officer 
approached the trio and asked for their names and identification. 
After supplying the officer with their names, the officer began 
patting-down the defendant. The officer discovered a knife 
strapped to the chest of defendant and he was subsequently charged 
with possession of a dangerous weapon by an unauthorized person. 
The court held the search unconstitutional [s]ince 
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Officer Beesley did not articulate reasonable objective facts 
for suspecting [defendant] had engaged in or was about to 
engage in criminal conduct, the balance between the public 
interest in crime prevention and [defendant]'s right to 
personal security and privacy tilts to protect [defendant] 
from this unreasonable police interference. Officer 
Beesley's detention of [defendant] was unreasonable within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment. Inasmuch as we hold the 
seizure of [defendant] unconstitutional, Officer Beesley had 
no right to conduct a pat-down search of [defendant] and, 
therefore, the knife should have been suppressed on 
[defendant]'s motion. 
Id. At 90. 
During the Motion to Suppress Hearing, Graham never testified 
that he observed any unusual conduct that might suggest, to a 
reasonable officer, that Cerroni was a danger to Graham or anyone 
else. Graham testified to the following regarding the stop and 
frisk: 
(Beginning at P. 8 L. 6) 
Q: All right. Upon obtaining the registration, what did you do 
then? 
A: I asked Mr. Cerroni if he had been consuming alcohol tonight, 
and he immediately became hostile, he was saying things like...I 
hadn't accused him of anything, just asked him for a license and 
registration. At that point I asked him to exit the vehicle for 
two reasons: One to check for Driving Under the Influence of 
alcohol or drugs, and number two, to search for and retrieve the 
open containers. 
Q: All right, and did he exit the vehicle? 
A: He did. He exited the vehicle and came towards the back of the 
car. 
Q: All right. 
A: At that point I told him that I was going to pat him 
down to make sure he had no weapons. (Emphasis added). 
(Continued at P. 9 L. 23) 
Q: What happened next? 
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A: After I made my intentions known to pat him down and search for 
weapons, he immediately pulled on a chain in his pocket and said, 
"All I have is this." And my attention was immediately drawn to 
the pocket as he was reaching for something. 
Q: And were you able to see anything in there, in the pocket? 
A: I just saw the chain come out and it had a watch on it. 
Q: All right. 
A: At that point— 
Q: Had it created any noticeable bulge in his pocket you observed? 
A: Yeah, that was a watch in his right front 
pocket. (Emphasis added) 
According to the Terry Court, in order to justify a search 
for weapons, an officer must first witness unusual conduct which 
may indicate possible criminal activity and present danger. See, 
Terry at 30. Graham never mentioned that he felt that his own or 
other's safety was ever threatened at the time he told Cerroni to 
exit his vehicle. In fact, Graham testified that he knew the 
object in Cerroni's right front pocket looked like a watch. 
(Motion to Suppress at 10). McMahon testified that he did not 
feel that his or Graham's safety was ever in jeopardy—McMahon 
clearly described the item during the Suppression Hearing as a 
small, round object that stuck out possibly an inch. (Motion to 
Suppress at 33). McMahon also testified that Graham did perform a 
Terry frisk of Cerroni. Id. Had Graham had a reasonable belief 
that Cerroni was about to commit a crime and Graham felt 
threatened, according to the law stated above, Graham was required 
to stop the search once he was satisfied Cerroni was not armed. 
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It is clear that no reasonable officer would have concluded 
that there was any present dangerf and the search, therefore, was 
in violation of Cerroni's Fourth Amendment rights and the evidence 
derived from the unconstitutional search should have been 
suppressed by the trial court. 
POINT III 
CERRONI DID HOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO PULL THE WATCH 
FROM HIS POCKET 
The Utah Supreme Court has described a number of factors that 
should be considered when determining whether there has been 
duress or coercion in obtaining a consent to search. In State v. 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980), the Court stated: 
Clearly the prosecution has the burden of establishing from 
the totality of the circumstances that the consent was 
voluntarily given; however, the prosecution is not required 
to prove that the defendant knew of his right to refuse to 
consent in order to show voluntariness. Factors which may 
show a lack of duress or coercion include: (1) the absence of 
a claim of authority to search by the officers; (2) the 
absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a mere 
request to search; and (4) the absence of deception or trick 
on the part of the officer. [Footnote omitted] 
In the case at bar, it is clear that Cerroni did not 
voluntarily pull the watch from his pocket. Graham was performing 
an illegal Terry frisk of Cerroni just seconds after Cerroni 
exited his vehicle. This show of force by the officer placed 
Cerroni in a position that was akin to being under arrest. 
Cerroni was clearly not free to leave at the time he was being 
patted down by the officer. Coupled together, any reasonable 
person would have interpreted the officers direction as a command 
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and not merely an inquiry. 
The officer performed the frisk even though he had no reason 
to believe that Cerroni was presently dangerous. Because the 
officer did not have any reasonable belief of this, it is clear 
that the frisk should not have taken place. But for the illegal 
conduct of the officer, Cerroni would never have pulled the watch 
from his pocket, and thus the drugs that were found during the 
illegal stop and search should have been suppressed by the trial 
court. 
POINT IV 
OFFICER GRAHAM HAD NO RIGHT TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE OBJECT IN 
CERRONI'S POCKET ONCE HE WAS CONVINCED IT WAS NOT A WEAPON 
In State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996), the Court 
held that an officer cannot expand the scope of detention without 
independent facts of illegal conduct. 
The defendant in that case was stopped by an officer for 
loitering in a parking lot while he was sitting in a car with a 
friend. The officer testified that he initially stopped the 
defendant because he felt they were violating the loitering 
ordinance. Another officer arrived and the defendant was then 
asked to step from the car so he could be checked for weapons. Id. 
At 448. 
Once the defendant was "outside of the vehicle and known to 
be unarmed, however, the officers had no reasonable, articulable 
suspicion either to continue questioning him regarding weapons or 
to search for them." Id. At 453. The Court stated that once the 
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officers learned that the defendant was unarmed, any further 
questioning was beyond the scope of his detention in the first 
place—violating the loitering ordinance. Id. At 454. 
Graham exceeded the scope of the Terry frisk when he inquired 
about the object in the front pocket of Cerroni's pocket. Once 
Graham learned that Cerroni was unarmed and posed no threat to 
either himself or to McMahon, the inquiry should have stopped. It 
is clear from the Record that both officers knew it was a watch 
and not a weapon in the front pocket of Cerroni's pants. 
Therefore, it was improper for Graham to inquire further about the 
object. 
CONCLUSION 
Cerroni's right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures was grossly violated when he was stopped by Utah Highway 
Patrolman Bruce Graham. Graham had no probable cause or a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Cerroni, and therefore 
the stop was not justified at its inception. Moreover, Graham had 
no reason to believe that Cerroni was presently dangerous, and 
thus the search performed by Graham was unconstitutional. This 
Court should remand this case with instructions that the evidence 
derived during the illegal stop and search be suppressed. 
DATED this 3 4 day of June, 1998. 
R\FREESTONE & ANGRRHOFF 
Wayne Ttr Freestone 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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No addendum is necessary for this brief. 
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